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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, RICH
COrXTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Plaintiff

-vs.-

Case No. 7810

EARL F. PASSEY, CLERK, BOARD OF
EDrCATION, RICH COUNTY
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S. BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant accepts plaintiff's statement of facts in
this case.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1.

Section 75-13-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as
amended, insofar as the same purports to empoweT
and authorize a board of education to issue and sell
bonds in excess of four per cent of the value of the
taxable property other than as ascertained ,by the
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2.

3.

last assessment for State and county purposes contravenes and is in violation of Article XIV, Section
4, of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
The indebtedness represented by said bonds in the
mnount of $162,000.00 would create an indebtedness
in excess of the legal indebtedness permissible under
Article XIV, Section 4, of the Constitution of the
State of Utah.
The provision "of the value of the taxable property
therein, the value to be ascertained by the last assessment for State and county purposes" in Article
XIV, Section 4, of the Constitution of the State of
Utah refers to the assessment roll valued under section 80-5-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended.

T.

!no11'll

1rele·

D

noni.

ARGUMENT
Defendant alleges that Section 75-13-12, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, as amended, insofar as the same purports to empower and authorize a board of education to
issue and sell bonds in excess of four per cent of the
value of the taxable property in a school district other
than as ascertained by the last assessment for state and
county purposes, contravenes and is in violation of Article XIV, Section 4 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah. Section 4 of Article XIV of the Utah Constitution
reads in part as follows:
"When authorized to create indebtedness as
provided in Section 3 of this Article, no county
shall become indebted to an amount, including
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3
existing indebtedness exceeding two per centum.
No city, town, school district or other Inunicipal
corporation, shall become indebted to an amount,
including existing indebtedness, exceeding four
per centun1 of the value of the taxable property
therein, the value to be ascertained by the last
assessment for State and County purposes, previous to the incurring of such indebtedness;

** *"
This seems clearly to Inean that what is cmnmonl~·
known as the assessed value, the value upon which taxes
are levied, is to 'be used for computing the debt limit.
Defendant recognizes the fact that other jurisdictions have differed as to the meaning of such a provision. We subn1it, however, that plaintiff has ignored
certain fundamental principles of interpretation and
plaintiff's contentions result in inconsistencies.
In the case of State ex rel. Boa,rd of Education of
To?£n of Salina v. Williamson, Atty. Gen., 76 Pac. 2d
384, (Oklahoma, 1938) the Attorney General had declined
to approve an issue of bonds voted by the school district
of the town of Salina, giving as his reason therefor that
the issue violated section 26 of article 10 of the Constitution in that the proposed bonds would, with existing
indebtedness, be in excess of "five per centum of the
valuation of the taxa:ble property therein, to be ascertained from the last assessment for State and county purposes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness."
The Attorney General construed the quoted clause to
refer to the valuation of the taxable property against
which taxes can be levied for general county purposes
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4
thereby excluding from the valuation the amounts deducted for homestead exemptions.
In holding that the Attorney General's view was
correct the court quoted from Thornburg v. School Dist.
No.3, 175 Mo. 12,75 S.W. 81,85:
" 'The clause of the Constitution under discussion is not aimed at school districts alone, but
its language is: 'No county, city, town, township,
school district or other political corporation or
subdivision of the state shall be allowed to become indebted,' etc. No distinction is made between any of these political corporations named,
in respect of the subject. The same ratio between
the value of the taxable property and the tax to
be levied is prescribed for all alike, in one group.
If we should give to the words 'assessment for
state and county purposes,' in this clause, the
meaning that appellant's counsel think they
should have, then we should have a school district
empowered to become indebted to a greater de·gree than 5 per cent of the property liable to be
taxed for its payment, while a county, city, town,
or township had no such power. The plain purpose of the Constitution is to forbid the incurring
of a public debt beyond a certain per centum of
the value of t"fi,e property taxable for its zwyment.
That purpose must not be· lost sight of in interpreting any doubtful words in the clause. The
language is not that the corporation shall not
incur indebtedness exceeding 5 per centum of the
value of property within its territorial limits subject to taxation for state and county purposes,
but it is that it shall not incur such indebtedness
'exceeding five per centum on the value of the
taxable property therein.' Then it specifies the
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source from wlliclt information as to tlwt value
is to be obtained; that is, the official assessment
for state and county purJwses. If the clause
under discussion had simply forbidden the school
district to incur indebtedness 'exceeding five per
centmn on the value of the taxable property therein,' without further demonstration, it would have
left open the question of how that value was to be
ascertained, and in that event the board of directors could have ordered an assessment for that
purpose. But the la\nnakers were unwilling to
leave it in that condition, and therefore they
pointed out the standard by which the valuation
was to be ascertained, to wit, the official assessment for state and county taxation. The words
'for state and county purposes,' in that clause,
are merely descriptive of the official document
to which reference is made.' (Emphasis ours.)"

The court then discussed other cases dealing with the
subject and stated:
"While the framers of the Constitution in
adopting section 26 of article 10 probably did not
have the exemption of homesteads in view, they
evidently realized that valuations would fluctuate
from year to year, hence fixed a standard or
mathematical formula to be used in all cases looking towards a proposed indebtedness. The sum
of existing indebtedness and the· proposed bonded
indebtedness must not aggregate more than 5 per
centum of the valuation of the taxable property
in the political subdivision seeking to become indebted. This valuation is to be ascertained from
the last assessment for state and county purposes.
"In the :Missouri case first hereinabove refe·rred to (Thornburg v. School Dist. No. 3), it will
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6
be noted that the court, by excluding the value of
the railroad property, confined the multiplicand
to the valuations of property against which taxes
could be levied for the particular indebtedness to
be incurred. No good reason is urged why the
same sort of rule should not be applied here. Furthermore, we do not believe that it can be said
that an assessed valuation to be used only for a
part of sinking fund levy purposes can be said to
fulfill the constitutional requirement 'for State
and county purposes.' This phrase must mean
not merely the valuation for some state or county
purpose, but must include for any county purpose; i.e., the valuation must be one that can be
used in levying taxes, not for one, but for any of
the various county purposes.
*

*

jno

[:ail

*

"Since, in this state, cities, school districts,
and other subdivisions have not been given the
right to make their own assessments, the list made
for county and state purposes is the valuation for
city and school districts, also, and is the governing assessment, 'the standard by which the valuation was to be ascertained.' In such a situation
the South Carolina Supreme Court declared:
'Under the law as it now exists in this state governing the assessment of property for city taxes,
no other assessment of such property for such
taxation than the assessment of such property
for the purpose of levying taxes for state and
county purposes can exist.' Todd v. City of
Laurens, 48 S.C. 395,26 S.E. 682, 684."
Defendant submits, that in adopting Section 4 of
Article XIV of the Utah Constitution, the people meant
by the "value to be ascertained by the last assessment
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for State and county purposes" to be the assessment
upon which wa:::; based the levy for general or current
government expenses for the State or county.
Plaintiff has stated in its brief (page 9) that there
is no reported Utah decision on this question. Plaintiff
cites the case of State ex rel. Cunningham et al. v.
Thomas et al., 16 Utah 86, 50 Pac. 615 (1897) wherein the
court quoted Article 13, Section 3 of the Constitution of
lT tah which provides :
"The legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessinent and taxation
on all property in the state, according to its value
in money, and shall prescribe by general law such
regulations as shall secure a just valuation for
taxation of all property; so that every person
and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to
the value of his, her, or its property."
Plaintiff states that plaintiff's position, if accepted by
the court, will not violate the constitutional requirement
that taxes and assessments be uniform. The very uniformity required by the constitution is the use of an accepted value for purposes of indebtedness and for purposes of taxation.
The following Utah cases consider the value of
"taxable property" as it is assessed for purposes of
taxation. Cutler v. Board of Education of Beaver County
School Dist., 57 Utah 73, 192 Pac. 621 (1920); Scott
County Auditor v. Salt Lake County et al., 58 Utah 25,
196 Pac. 1022 (1921); State of Utah v. Francis Armstrong et al., 19 Utah 117, 56 Pac. 951 (1899); State ex
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rel. Cunningham v. Thomas, supra. See also Doon Township v. Cummins, 3·5 L. Ed. 1044, 142 U.S. 366, 12 S. Ct.
220 (1891).
In the case of State of Utah v. Francis Armstrong et al., supra, the court, considering the powers of
a board of equalization stated:
"It is admitted by the pleadings, and because
of the demurrer, that at the time when the resolution in question was adopted, the defendants
were sitting as the county board of equalization,
and that the board, after carefully e·xamining the
assessments of real estate in Salt Lake City, as
made by the assessor, and hearing evidence with
regard to the valuations, decided that changes in
the valuations were necessary to correct errors
made by him in valuing portions of real estate,
and to make the assessments conform to the value
of the property in money. The resolution, or
order complained of, relates to certain portions
or districts of the- city, and under its terms, the
assessment on all real estate in such districts was
raised by adding a certain percentum to the valuation placed upon it by the assessor. The real
estate of the relator was included within those
districts, and the order was made without service
of notice on each owner of property affected by
the change in valuation. Counsel for the relator
contend that the order, having been made without such notice, is unauthorized by law and beyond the jurisdiction of the board, and is, therefore, void. The defendants maintain that, when
sitting as a board of equalization, they have
power to raise or lower the assessment in any district in the county when necessary to make the
valuations of property conform to its true value
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in n1oney, and that the general notice of their
as such board is sufficient. Respecting
the subject of taxation, it is provided in Section
2, ~\.rticle 13 of the constitution of this State, as
follow~: ·~\.11 property in the State, not exempt
under the laws of the United States, or under
this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to
its value, to be ascertained as provided by law.'
"Section 3 of the same article, so far as mate-rial here, reads: 'The legislature shall provide
by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment
and taxation on all property in the State, according to its value in money, and shall prescribe by
general law such regulations as shall secure a just
valuation for taxation of all property; so that
every person and corporation shall pay a tax in
proportion to the value of his, her, or its property.'
"Comn1enting on these provisions of the constitution, this court in State v. Thomas, 16 Utah
86, observed: 'The manifest intention is that all
taxable property shall bear its just proportion
of the burdens of taxation. These two sections of
the constitution harmonize with each other; and,
by reading and considering them together, it becomes clear that all taxable property within this
State must be assessed and taxed on a valuation
fixed at its actual cash value, or as near such
value as is reasonably practicable.' "
~itting

In Cutler v. Board of Education of Beaver County
School Dist., supra, this court considered Article 14, Sections 3 and 4, and held it was proper to deduct from the
present indebtedness of the county school district the
amount of sinking fund available for reducing indebtedness, and the amount assessed and levied for sinking
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fund purposes and for funds to apply on present bond
indebtedness, but that it was not proper to deduct from
such present indebtedness the amount of taxes levied
and assessed for general school purposes, since proceeds
of such levy would not be used to reduce the assessed
indebtedness, but would be applied to the payment of
debts incurred during the· year. This case wa-s decided
prior to the 1951 amendrnent to section 75-13-12, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, and the present issue was not
before the court. The court spoke of "taxable property"
and considered it for its purposes according to its assessed value:

i• (
tur

ft~

~~]1

"The special levy of $39,166.37 for general
school purposes for the year 1920, claimed by defendant as an offset to the existing indebtedness
of the district, however, presents much greater
difficulties. While the levy has been legally made
and the collection of the tax may be regarded as a
certainty, it is difficult to conceive any theory
upon which these taxes may be legally applied
for the reduction of the bonded indebtedness complained of by petitioner. Presumably the district,
if not already, will be during the year 1920, under
contractual obligations to the amount of this tax
for the proper support and maintenance of its
public schools. If in theory these taxes may be
legally applied in the reduction of the existing
bonded indebtedness of the district, then necessarily, to that extent, the district, when said item
is so applied, instantaneously becomes indebted
in the same amount for general school purposes.
We do not think the application of this levy to the
existing bonded indebtedness, nor the treating
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of thi~ ite1n a~ an offset in determining the legal
debt lin1it of the district, would he in keeping with
the ~pirit of our ~tate Constitution and would
be a direct violation of the purposes for which the
fund wa~ created and intended to be applied. In
our judg1nent, this ite1n claimed by defendant as
an offset to the existing bonded indebtedness of
the district should be, for the purpose of arriving
at the debt limit of the district, excluded."
It would seen1 that the reasoning in the Cutler case
is consistent with the Oklahoma case of State ex rel.
Board of Education, sttpra. Section 4 of Article 14 of the
Utah constitution should be held to refer to the assessed
valuation as shown on the assessment rolls of the county.
As stated before, this question has arisen in various other states, and it has been decided by the supreme
courts of Illinois, South Carolina, Alabama, Minnesota
and Washington that the assessed value is the one that
should be used in determining the constitutional limits
under similar provisions of the applicable state constitutions.
In City of Chicago v. Fishburn, 189 Ill. 367, (1901)
plaintiff taxpayers sought to enjoin the defendant city
and its officers from issuing a bridge bond, contending
that the city had reached and passed its constitutional
and statutory debt limit. The issue in the case was
whether the debt limit should be ascertained on the basis
of the full value as determined by the assessor or upon
the assessed value, which is one-fifth of the full value.
The constitutional debt limit provision, section 12 of
article 9 read as follows:
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"No county, city, township, school district or
other municipal corporation, shall be allowed to
become indebted in any manner or for any purpose, to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five per centum
on the value of the taxable property therein, to
be ascertained by the last assessment for State
and County taxes, previous to the incurring of
such indebtedness."
The statute in force when the constitution was
adopted required an assessment of property at its actual
value· and continued to so require until the Act of 1898
which governed at the time of this case, but it was common knowledge that under the prior statute property was
not assessed at its full value. The court stated as follows:
"We do not think that the requirement that
the assessors shall set down the full value and
take a fixed share thereof as the assessed valm~
can be held to change the meaning of the constitution that the limit is to be determined by the
assessed value. We think the constitution means
that the limit of municipal indebtedness shall
be computed upon and shall not exceed five per
cent of the official estimate of the assessors for
the preceding year as a basis for the apportionment of State and county taxes. That is the
amount which is set down in the column under the
head of 'assessed value.'"
In State v. Tolly, 16 S.E. 195 (1892), the Supreme
Court of South Carolina had a similar question when
the city council of the City of Anderson attempted to
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use as a basis for cmnputing constitutional debt lilnit a
figure which included the nllue of all property assessed
for taxation as per city tax book~, plus the value of certain other property which would have been taxable by
the city had it not been exempted temporarily from taxation by ordinance. 'Yithout this additional value, the
proposed issue would have caused the constitutional debt
limit to be exceeded. The pertinent constitutional pro- ,
Yision read as follows :
"Any bonded debt hereafter incurred by any
county, municipal corporation, or political division of this state shall never exceed eight per
centum of the assessed value of all the taxable
property therein."
The court dismissed the petition for mandamus to
comp€1 the mayor to sign the bonds saying:
"Accordingly we find that the language used
in the constitutional provision is not 'eight per
centum' of the actual or real market value of the
taxable property, but the language is, 'of the assessed value of all the taxabale property therein.'
The word 'assessed' has, and had at the time of
the adoption of the constitutional provision now
under consideration, a well-defined meaning when
applied to taxable property and the framers of
that provision must be assumed to have used it in
the same sense in which it was used in the various
acts of the legislature relating to the subject of
taxation."
The Supreme Court of Alabama reached a similar
conclusion in Smith v. Austin, 76 So. 404 (1917). This
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was a bill to enJOin defendants as the Commissioners
Court of Elmore County from borrowing $30,000. Section 224 of the constitution then in force read:
"No county shall become indebted in an
amount including present indebtedness, greater
than three and one-half per centum of the assessed value of the property therein."
The statute governing assessments, Section 36A of the
Revenue Act (Gen. Acts 1911, page 185) provided that
all:

a~~

]ei

"* * * taxable property within this state shall be
assessed, for the purpose of taxation, at sixty
per cent of its fair and reasonable cash value."
The assessed valuation of the property was $5,917,635
and existing county indebtedness was $240,000 which the
court said was more than 3Yz o/o of the total assessed
value. It was held that the basis for computing constitutional debt limit was the "value of the property as
assessed for taxation and not its actual or cash value."
In State v. Clausen, 199 Pac. 752 (1921), the Supreme Court of the State of Washington likewise held
that where a statutory debt limit provided:
"No taxing district shall for any purpose become indebted in any manner to an amount exceeding one and one-half per centum of the last
assessed valuation of the taxable property in such
taxing district, without the assent of three-fifths
of the voters therein voting at an election to be
held for that purpose, nor in cases requiring such
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a~~ent

shall the total indebtedness at any time
exceed five per cenhun of the last assessed valuation of the taxable property in such taxing di~
trict."

A school district could not incur debt in excess of five
per cent of the assessed valuation; and that the basis
of computation was not the full value of the property
within the district.
Sin1ilarly in Phelps v. City of Minneapolis, 219 N.W.
87:2 (1928), the .Jiinnesota Supreme Court held that the
assessed value is the deter1nining factor in computing
debt limit rather than the full cash value of the property
where a statute specifically provided that property was
to be assessed at specified percentages of full value.
Defendant urges in the case at bar that the language
of the Utah Constitution which sets the basis for ascertaining the debt limit refers to the figure shown on the
assessment rolls. The reason for this lies in the need for
certainty in the determination of what that value is.
\V ere there no fixed standards readily ascertainable and
a matter of public record, it would give birth to mnch
confusion and discord when one tried to determine the
precise basis for computing the aforesaid limit. There
is no allegation in the complaint that any assessments
were made fraudulently or that in any way those assessments are below the figure provided by law.
CONCLUSION
Article XIV, Section 4, of the Utah Constitution is
not ailned at school districts alone, but its language is
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"no city, town, school district or municipal corporation."
To give the words "assessment for State and county purposes" the meaning plaintiff requests would empower
a school district to become indebted to a greater degree
than cities, towns or other municipal corporations. The
official assessment is specified, and since the official assessment provision states "all taxable property must be
assessed at forty per cent of its reasonable cash value,"
section 75-13-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended
must be in violation of the constitution and void.
Defendant respectfully submits that the complaint
and the alternative extraordinary writ should be dismissed. Further, section 75-13-12, Utah Code Annotated
1943, as amended, should be declared unconstitutional,
null, void and of no effect.

GRANT C. AADNESEN
Appearing as Attorney for Defendant
921 Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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